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Abstract. This article explores problems related to establishing the ICSID jurisdiction 
to the BITs dispute settlement provisions by application of the MFN clause. Being that 
the application of the clause asks for very extensive interpretation of the BIT which 
contains this clause, the practice of ICSID tribunals in this field has been very much 
debated in professional and academic circles. Not only has it raised concerns about 
stability, predictability and legal certainty in international investment law but, more 
importantly, about its further development in respect of arbitrators’ powers. The 
article analyzes three representative cases in which ICSID tribunals made decisions on 
jurisdiction based on the usage of the MFN clause: Maffezini, Plama and Salini. On 
the basis of this analysis, certain guidelines are proposed that might be applied in 
future disputes brought before ICSID tribunals. These guidelines are in compliance 
with modern tendencies in international scene, which should be considered as the 
indicators of the direction for further development of this particular area of law. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The most favored nation clause (MFN clause) is regularly entered into the text of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and it is considered to be one of the basic standards of 
treatment for foreign investors. Although the frequent (or better to say default) use of this 
clause has led to identifying the legal definition and structure of this clause, its application 
is still a field of insufficiently clear and precise criteria. The application of the MFN 
clause on procedural provisions of BITs raises special concerns because this scope of 
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application is yet to be discovered; on the other hand, it is related to the very essence of 
arbitration as the system for resolving investment disputes. Particularly, in the previous 
practice of ICSID tribunals, there were cases in which the claimant sought to establish 
ICSID jurisdiction by relying on the MFN clause. The decisions reached by ICSID tribunals 
in these cases were much debated because of the uncertainty they might add to in the 
sphere of international investment law, and because they are deemed to have the potential 
to alter the concept of contracting arbitration and balancing power of parties to the investment 
disputes with respect to their mutual consent to regulate their rights and obligations in a certain 
manner, stipulated in the BIT they concluded. 
This article analyses the reasoning of ICSID tribunals in decisions on jurisdiction in three 
cases: Maffezini
1
, Plama
2
 and Salini
3
. These decisions had a great influence in professional 
public, especially the one reached in Maffezini, where the Tribunal allowed establishing the 
ICSID jurisdiction by expanding the application of the MFN clause to procedural provisions 
of the BIT. Given the lack of previous practice in this area, the Tribunal applied extensive 
interpretation in deciding on its competence. Even though there are no clear indicators of the 
scope of application of the MFN clause, its application might have an impact on general 
equilibrium of the treaty, which will necessarily be undermined by the substitution of 
provisions which are speciﬁcally negotiated and which constitute its pillars (Radi, 2007: 17). 
This article argues that, in the process of reaching the decision in Maffezini, the Tribunal 
set certain standards on the review of language used in text of investment treaties as well as 
raised the State‟s practice standards which might be significant for interpreting MFN 
clauses. Also, in explaining its decision, the Tribunal set some limitations on the application 
of the MFN clause to procedural rights, which are important because they are based on 
public policy concerns and they are stipulated in a manner that should allow prevention of 
the abuse of rights by the disputing parties. In Plama and Salini, the other two tribunals have 
reached different conclusions. Yet, given the fact that the decisions are based on different 
circumstances and that tribunals have explained why their decisions differ from those in the 
previous case, all three of them provide for a good basis for abstracting certain rules for 
interpretation of BITs and application of the MFN clauses on procedural provisions of the 
BIT in future cases. This should reflect on raising the level of legal certainty and predictability 
in this sphere of international investment law, thus contributing to the social legitimacy of the 
investment disputes resolution system. The analysis in this article goes even further and 
explains the specific requirements of international environment that arbitrators must take into 
account when resolving investment disputes, and how they are reflected on the usage of MFN 
clause. This article is an attempt to provide a legal analysis of the elements that should be 
considered when interpreting possibilities of applying the MFN clause in establishing ICSID 
jurisdiction; thereupon, the article explores whether these elements comply with modern trends 
in the development of international investment law relations.  
                                                          
1 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7) 
2 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24) 
3 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/13) 
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2. ANALYSIS OF ICSID TRIBUNALS PROCEDURAL DECISIONS 
2.1. Introduction to cases: Maffezini, Plama and Salini 
2.1.1. Maffezini 
In Maffezini, investment dispute was submitted to arbitration by an Argentinean claimant, 
against Spain, under the Argentina-Spain BIT. This treaty stipulated that the dispute could only 
be submitted to international arbitration if the competent domestic tribunal rendered a decision 
on the merits that failed to resolve the dispute, or if no decision on the merits had been 
rendered within 18 months of the initiation of domestic proceeding, whichever was sooner. 
The claimant failed to meet this condition and submitted the dispute to the ICSID tribunal. 
For establishing the ICSID jurisdiction, the claimant relied upon the MFN clause contained 
in the Argentina-Spain BIT. In Article IV of this BIT it was stipulated: „„In all matters 
subject to this agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that extended by 
each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third country‟‟. Then, the 
claimant referred to the Chile-Spain BIT in which there was no obligation to meet any 
previous conditions before submitting the investment dispute to international arbitration. The 
claimant argued that Chilean investors in Spain were treated more favorably than Argentine 
investors in Spain and that, based on the MFN clause, he was entitled to the same treatment 
as Chilean investors, which consequently entitled him to submit the investment dispute 
directly to the ICSID tribunal. 
In this case, the Tribunal held that: “notwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty... does 
not refer expressly to dispute settlement as covered by the most favored nation clause, the 
Tribunal considers that there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement 
arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors”4. As a result, 
it concluded that: “if a third-party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes 
that are more favorable… than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended 
to the beneﬁciary of the [MFN]clause as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis 
principle”5.  
The Tribunal allowed the claimant‟s argument that jurisdiction could be founded upon 
a combination of the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT and the dispute resolution 
provision of the Chile-Spain BIT. The Tribunal endorsed the use of MFN clauses intended 
to bypass prior resource to domestic courts, which means that it altered the procedure of the 
dispute resolution mechanism to which the investors had already had access. It is important 
to note that the Tribunal set exceptions from the extensive interpretation of MFN clause, 
based on public policy concerns which have been taken into account in cases dealt with by 
ICSID tribunals. 
2.1.2. Plama 
In Plama, a Cypriot claimant sought to establish the ICSID tribunal jurisdiction over a 
dispute with Bulgaria with reference to the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT. The problem was that 
the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT contains narrow dispute resolution provisions due to the fact 
                                                          
4 See: Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25, 
2000, 16 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 212 (2001); 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002); 124 I.L.R. 9 (2003), paragraph 54 
5 Ibid., paragraph 56 
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that it was entered into during the communist era in Bulgaria. These provisions allow only 
for the resolution of disputes related to legality of expropriation and, more specifically, to 
the amount of compensation. The claimant relied on the MFN clause to incorporate 
dispute resolution provisions of the Bulgaria-Finland BIT, which does not contain these 
restrictions. 
In this case, the Tribunal rejected the claimant‟s argument, holding that an agreement 
to arbitrate must be “clear and unambiguous”6, and that the language used to stipulate the 
MFN clause in the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT does not meet this criterion. The Tribunal also 
emphasized that: “dispute resolution provisions in a speciﬁc treaty have been negotiated 
with a view to resolving disputes under that treaty. Contracting states cannot be presumed 
to have agreed that those provisions can be enlarged by incorporating dispute resolution  
provisions  from other treaties negotiated in an entirely different context”.7 
In analyzing the reasoning given by the Tribunal in Plama case, this article focuses on 
the distinction between different circumstances in Maffezini and Plama, which are ultimately 
used for drawing relevant conclusions on the differences. In Plama, there is a case of denial 
of resorting to the MFN clause to “shop” for an entirely different settlement mechanism. 
Understanding the denial to apply the MFN clause to establish ICSID jurisdiction in this 
case, thus brings the two cases and the legal reasoning used in them closer together, 
especially having in mind that in Maffezini the Tribunal set a simple rule which should shield 
tribunals from approving the claimants‟ abuse of powers, which will be discussed further on.  
2.1.3. Salini 
In Salini, an Italian investor brought a claim before an ICSID tribunal against Jordan, 
under the Italy-Jordan BIT. In this case, on the basis of the MFN clause, the investor 
attempted to introduce a provision from the Jordan-US BIT and the Jordan-UK BIT in 
order to establish ICSID jurisdiction. The Tribunal analyzed the decision reached in Maffezini 
case and concluded that in some BITs the MFN clauses contain broad language referring to “all 
matters” subject to the agreement. The wording of the MFN clause contained in the Italy-
Jordan BIT was not so wide. Nor was there any evidence of a common intention of the parties 
to have that clause apply to dispute resolution issues
8
.  
The Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to resolve this case. Even so, it did not 
completely disagree with the tribunal‟s reasoning in Maffezini case but stated the differences 
in these two cases and expressed some concerns about the applicability of the approach 
adopted by the Maffezini Tribunal. 
Ultimately, the usage of the MFN clause to establish ICSID jurisdiction was not approved 
because the Tribunal rejected reliance on a third-party dispute resolution provision by means 
of the MFN clause to establish jurisdiction over contractual compensation claims not 
covered by the basic treaty.  
                                                          
6 See: Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction of February 8, 2005, 20 
ICSID Rev.—FILJ 262 (2005); 44 ILM 721 (2005), paragraph 198 
7 Ibid., paragraph 207 
8 See: Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan , Decision of the 
Tribunal on Jurisdiction of November 29, 2004, 20 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 148 (2005); 44 ILM 569 (2005), 
paragraph 115 
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2.2. Analysis of ICSID tribunals’ reasoning in rendered decisions 
The analysis of previous ICSID decisions allows for abstracting guidelines that can be 
used to determine the possibility of establishing ICSID jurisdiction by application of the 
MFN clause contained in the basic investment treaty. Considerations of ICSID tribunals 
in these cases can be summarized through the following steps: 
 determining the intentions of the parties to the dispute,  
 determining whether conditions for the application of the MFN clause are fulfilled 
in accordance with the requirements set by the legal nature of this clause,  
 determining the contents of investor treatment, 
 determining if exceptions to the application of the MFN clause apply to particular case. 
2.2.1. Determining the intentions of the parties to the dispute 
The ICSID Convention
9
 provides specific rules for determining whether ICSID jurisdiction 
can be established for resolving investment disputes. According to the preamble and Article 
25 of the ISCID Convention, the Centre has the competence to resolve investment dispute if 
the parties to that dispute consent in writing to submit the dispute to the Centre. It is 
stipulated that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or 
approval of this Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under any obligation to 
submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration. Reasoning of the Plama Tribunal 
is in accordance with these provisions: “the intention to incorporate dispute settlement 
provisions must be clearly and unambiguously expressed”10. 
However, determining jurisdiction of the ICSID centre cannot be viewed in isolation 
and without linking it to the role, purpose, object and operation of arbitration as a flexible 
system for the settlement of investment disputes designed to be easily adaptable to the 
needs of the business world and contribute to the process of making profit, with as little 
interruption as possible. Based on these needs, arbitration is shaped as a system embodying 
some specific features: efficiency, flexibility, adaptability to the changing circumstances and 
sensitivity to the development of legal framework it operates within.  
Furthermore, arbitration is based on autonomy of the will of the parties to the dispute. 
When determining all the relevant issues in a dispute, tribunals must take into account this 
basic principle, from which they derive power to resolve investment dispute and incorporate 
it in their decision making processes. It is important not only when deciding on the scope of 
substantive rights but also on the procedural ones. For this reason, when determining 
whether the MFN clause can be extended to the establishment of ICSID jurisdiction, one of 
the elements that should be considered is the intention of the disputing parties, as the 
exercise of the parties‟ autonomy of will. If the Parties to an investment agreement intended 
the MFN clause to apply to the procedural aspects of their relations and clearly stated so in 
their agreement, then tribunals will have no dilemma. But, if not, as the tribunal concluded in 
Maffezini: “It must be established whether the omission was intended by the parties or can 
reasonably be inferred from the practice followed by the parties in their treatment of 
foreign investors and their own investors”.11  
                                                          
9 Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states (1966), 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp 
10 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, supra note 6, paragraph 204 
11 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, supra note 4, paragraph 53 
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In order to determine the intent of the parties, it is necessary to analyze the provisions 
of the basic agreement. The three tribunals did so in accordance with the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
12
, that regulates the interpretation of contracts. 
In order to determine the scope of the MFN clause contained in the basic treaty, tribunals 
first analyzed its language. Article 31 Para 1 of the Vienna Convention stipulates that a 
contract must be interpreted in good faith by giving the ordinary meaning to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. This approach in 
interpretation can be clearly seen in the decisions made by ISCID panels. In Maffezini, the 
panel analyzed the language used to stipulate the MFN clause and came to a conclusion 
that it was very wide: “In all matters subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be 
less favorable than that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by 
investors of a third Country.” 
In Salini and Plama, the tribunals analyzed the MFN clauses contained in the (respective) 
treaties they were deciding upon, then compared them with the language used in stipulating 
the MFN clause in Maffezini, and made a clear distinction between the analyzed clauses. In 
Salini, the panel stated that the language of the MFN clause was not as extensive as the one 
in Maffezini
13
. The same conclusion was reached in Plama.
14
 By referring to the differences 
in the language used to stipulate MFN clauses incorporated in different investment treaties, 
the panels explained how different interpretations of intentions of the parties can be made, 
thus justifying different possibilities of its application for establishment of ICSID jurisdiction. 
In relevant literature, there is an opinion that both parties are required to consent to 
arbitration for a tribunal to have any jurisdiction. Unless an MFN clause can serve as an 
expression of the State‟s consent to arbitrate directly with investors, the MFN clause cannot 
be used to establish a tribunal‟s jurisdiction (Cole, 2010: 36). This is where determining the 
parties‟ intent can come into place because it can reveal whether the expression of such 
consent can be found in the language of the MFN clause. Also, while the language of each 
specific MFN clause must ultimately control the manner of its operation, every MFN clause 
is nonetheless a promise of a certain type of treatment. As such, given the extent to which 
conclusions may be drawn on the operation of MFN clauses from their generally accepted 
purpose, such conclusions will be applicable in every case in which an MFN clause is 
invoked (Cole, 2010: 39). 
In determining the intentions of the parties, tribunals did not limit their interpretation 
to the literal one. Pursuant to Article 31 Para 2 of the Vienna Convention, tribunals took 
into account subsequent practice in the application of the investment treaty which serves 
to establish the parties‟ understanding on its interpretation. Specifically, tribunals examined 
the practice of host countries in concluding BITs with other countries, the public policy 
goals pursued by host countries in relevant period of time as well as the perceived purpose of 
the investment treaty. This analysis was used to determine whether the choice of a dispute 
resolution system has been altered in the later practice of the host countries. This was done 
in Maffezini when the Tribunal looked into the content of procedural provisions in BITs 
concluded with a number of other countries after the Argentina-Spain BIT was concluded.
15
 
                                                          
12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/ 
Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf 
13 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan , supra note 8, paragraph 115 
14 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, supra note 6, paragraphs 184-192 
15 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, supra note 4, paragraphs 57-61 
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Also, based on the analysis of relations with other countries, which was done in Plama
16
, an 
attempt was made to determine whether the different economic and political orientation may 
transfer to investment relations in question, and on that basis justify the jurisdiction of the 
ICSID center in matters in which, traditionally, its jurisdiction is not foreseen.  
Moreover, Article 25 Para 4 of the ICSID Convention provides that any Contracting 
State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or at any 
time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or 
would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. If a Contracting State did 
not exclude classes of disputes from submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre, it can be 
argued that even if written consent to jurisdiction was not given, there is room to explore 
the intent of the Contracting State and whether it relied upon failure to explicitly exclude 
the dispute in question. This is a rather extensive approach towards establishing the ICSID 
jurisdiction but it is in compliance with respecting the autonomy of the will of disputing 
parties and honoring the fact that, in time of concluding investment treaties, parties cannot 
predict all the circumstances that will be put upon them in their future relations. This can 
also be viewed as one of the consequences of the very essence of foreign direct investments 
relations: long-term implementation. Analysis of parties‟ intentions must take into account 
the specificity and the legal nature of the relationship between them. 
In all three cases, tribunals acted in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties governing the interpretation of contracts and, on the basis of 
different types of interpretation, they identified the elements relevant for determining the intent 
of the parties in pursuing the application of the MFN clause. The application of those elements 
to specific circumstances of each of these cases has served as a basis for deciding on the 
establishment of ICSID jurisdiction by the expansion of the MFN clause.  
2.2.2. Determining whether the conditions for the application of the MFN clause are 
fulfilled in accordance with the requirements set by the legal nature of this clause 
It is not enough to determine that the parties to the dispute had the intention to apply 
the MFN clause. To make it applicable, there are some further criteria that must be met. 
When deciding about the applicability of the MFN, tribunals must consider the fulfillment 
of conditions originating from the legal nature of this clause. They relate to the subject matter of 
the basic treaty. In Maffezini, the tribunal concluded that “the right approach is to consider that 
the subject matter to which the clause applies is indeed established by the basic treaty… if these 
matters are more favorably treated in a third-party treaty then, by operation of the clause, that 
treatment is extended to the beneficiary under the basic treaty. If the third-party treaty refers to a 
matter not dealt with in the basic treaty, that matter is res inter alios acta in respect of the 
beneficiary of the clause.
17
 Furthermore, “if a third-party treaty contains provisions for the 
settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the protection of the investor‟s rights and 
interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of 
the most favored nation clause. (…) Of course, the third-party treaty has to relate to the same 
subject matter as the basic treaty.”18  
                                                          
16 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, supra note 6, paragraphs 195-197 
17 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, supra note 4, paragraph 45 
18 Ibid., paragraph 56 
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The adoption of this principle as one of the standards for the application of the MFN 
clause could be of great importance for the further practice of ICSID panels. Of course, it 
would limit the possibility to apply the MFN clause in procedural matters. Yet, it could be 
argued that such limitation respects the interests of the disputing parties as well as the 
manner in which they originally regulated mutual rights and obligations under the investment 
agreement. This principle is also in line with respecting the intentions of parties to regulate 
specific matters in their mutual relations. 
Furthermore, the very essence of the MFN clause is to provide equality among private 
entities that are doing business in the host country. It operates by adjusting the treatment 
accorded to those actors so that they can all have equal opportunities and be bound by the 
same conditions. However, the MFN clause cannot be understood as a means to alter the 
legal framework created by the investment treaty; so, it can expand to treatment not covered 
by the basic treaty at all.  
The conditions for applying the MFN clause that are derived from its legal nature are of 
great importance, particularly considering the consequences this application might have. To 
better understand this importance, it is necessary to point out to the differences in the 
application of the MFN clause contained in trade agreements and in investment agreements. 
The application of the MFN clause in trade agreements relates to the treatment of goods at 
the point when they are crossing national borders. On the other hand, investments give rise 
to long-term relations in which the foreign investor is expected to comply with laws and 
regulations of the host state in their totality, throughout the realization of the investment. 
The content of the treatment of investment is therefore much more complex and harder to 
determine because it is based on the overall regulatory measures, as well as on other factors that 
affect the host state market. If the MFN clause is applied without any restrictions, such 
application may lead to a change of the entire legal system that applies to investment. This 
could be perceived as a new system operating within the State‟s legal system which pertains 
solely to foreign investor that is party to the investment dispute. It would be hard to imagine that 
contracting states intended to create such a legal framework in the process of accepting the 
investment treaty they are parties to. This scenario may be prevented by linking the scope of 
applying the MFN clause to the subject matter of the basic treaty, which ultimately adds to 
predictability, stability and equality in international investment relations.  
This was concluded in Maffezini (as cited above) as well as in Salini.
19
 In its decision, 
the latter tribunal cited numerous other decisions and agreed with the findings that “the 
most favored nation clause can only attract matters belonging to the same category of 
subjects as that to which the clause itself relates.”20 
2.2.3. Determining the contents of investor treatment 
If conditions for the application of the MFN clause are met, it is necessary to determine 
the content of the more favorable treatment that should be assigned to a foreign investor by 
means of this clause. In order to define a tertium comparationis, there are some issues 
that should be resolved first. Namely, there are two preliminary questions that need to be 
addressed as a prerequisite for the application of MFN clause:  
                                                          
19 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, supra note 8, paragraphs 
106-112 
20 Ibid., paragraph 107 
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 can the procedural provision of an investment agreement regulating settlement of 
investment disputes be considered part of the treatment standard, and 
 if so, what can be considered a more favorable treatment with respect to procedural 
aspects?  
The ICSID panels considered these issues in the above cases. Traditionally, the 
standard of treatment includes substantive provisions. But, in Maffezini, “the Tribunal 
considers that there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement arrangements 
are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are also related to the 
protection of rights...”21 In addition, regulating the substantive standard of treatment is of 
importance to investors only if there is a mechanism at their disposal that stands as a 
guarantor for the application of these standards. 
This position was accepted in Plama and explained in more detail. The Tribunal first 
stated that “the object and purpose of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT are: “the creation of 
favorable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party.” Then, the tribunal cited the Report of the Executive 
Directors on the ICSID Convention of 1965 (Exhibit C60, paragraph 9) in which it was 
outlined that “the creation of an institution designed to facilitate the settlement of disputes 
between States and foreign investors can be a major step toward promoting an atmosphere 
of mutual confidence and thus stimulating a larger flow of private international capital in 
those countries which wish to attract it”.22 This should demonstrate that both the Bulgaria-
Cyprus BIT and the ICSID Convention are suppose to contribute to the same cause; so, it 
is in coexistence that they form a complete treatment of foreign investors that fully 
considers all aspects of investors‟ rights. 
The second question is what can be considered a more favorable treatment. The analyzed 
practice of ICSID tribunals does not answer this question. The history of international 
arbitration indicates that there were conflicting opinions on this issue. In Maffezini, it was 
considered that “traders and investors, like their States of nationality, have traditionally felt 
that their rights and interests are better protected by recourse to international arbitration than 
by submission of disputes to domestic courts, while the host governments have traditionally 
felt that the protection of domestic courts is to be preferred”.23  
Yet, for the purpose of critical analysis of the tribunal‟s reasoning, it is important to 
note that in Maffezini, even though the tribunal considered that there are elements that are 
satisfactory to conclude that ICSID jurisdiction can be established on the basis of the 
MFN clause, the tribunal at no time estimated the work of Spanish courts to determine if 
they really were less effective in protecting the rights of investors than ISCID arbitration 
(Cole, 2010: 30). 
In Plama, the tribunal took it a step further and considered some of the difficulties that 
may arise out of this question: “The Claimant argues that it is obviously more favorable 
for the investor to have a choice among different dispute resolution mechanisms... The 
Tribunal is inclined to agree with the Claimant that, in this particular case, a choice is better 
than no choice. But what if one BIT provides for UNCITRAL arbitration and another 
provides for ICSID? Which is more favorable?”24  
                                                          
21 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, supra note 4, paragraph 54 
22 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, supra note 6, paragraph 193 
23 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, supra note 4, paragraph 55 
24 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, supra note 6, paragraph 208 
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The formula that can be used to overcome these difficulties might be to establish 
whether the forum for settlement of investment disputes agreed upon in a third-party 
agreement would do a better job of enforcing the substantive rights granted in the BIT than 
the procedure incorporated into the basic treaty (Cole, 2010: 73). 
2.2.4. Determining if exceptions to the application of the MFN clause  
apply to particular case 
In Maffezini, even though the tribunal adopted extensive interpretation of the possibility 
to use the MFN clause in relation to procedural aspects of investment treatment, the Tribunal 
set some very important limitations: “As a matter of principle, the beneficiary of the clause 
should not be able to override public policy considerations that the contracting parties might 
have envisaged as fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in question, 
particularly if the beneficiary is a private investor, as will often be the case. The scope of the 
clause might thus be narrower than it appears at first sight.”25 The tribunal then enumerated 
examples on what these public policy considerations might be
26
:  
 “if one contracting party has conditioned its consent to arbitration on the exhaustion 
of local remedies… this requirement could not be bypassed by invoking the most 
favored nation clause in relation to a third-party agreement that does not contain this 
element since the stipulated condition reflects a fundamental rule of international law 
fundamental rule of international law”; 
 “if the parties have agreed to a dispute settlement arrangement which includes the 
so-called fork in the road, that is, a choice between submission to domestic courts 
or to international arbitration, and where the choice once made becomes final and 
irreversible,  this stipulation cannot be bypassed by invoking the clause”; 
 “if the agreement provides for a particular arbitration forum, such as ICSID, for 
example, this option cannot be changed by invoking the clause, in order to refer 
the dispute to a different system of arbitration”; 
 “if the parties have agreed to a highly institutionalized system of arbitration that 
incorporates precise rules of procedure… it is clear that neither of these mechanisms 
could be altered by the operation of the clause because these very specific provisions 
reflect the precise will of the contracting parties”. 
In Plama, the Tribunal also set some limitations: “It is one thing to add to the treatment 
provided in one treaty more favorable treatment provided elsewhere. It is quite another thing to 
replace a procedure specifically negotiated by parties with an entirely different mechanism.”27  
In Maffezini, the Tribunal adopted a principle with multiple exceptions but, in Plama, the 
Tribunal concluded that “instead there should be a different principle with one, single 
exception: an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute 
settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in 
the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.”28  
Given that the tribunals are always required to interpret provisions of investment treaties 
and determine their scope in regulating mutual rights of parties to the dispute by applying 
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27 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, supra note 6, paragraph 209 
28 Ibid., at paragraph 223 
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these provisions to each specific case, the reasoning of the Tribunal in Maffezini might be 
taken as a governing principle in resolving future cases: “It is clear, in any event, that a 
distinction has to be made between the legitimate extension of rights and benefits by means 
of the operation of the clause, on the one hand, and disruptive treaty-shopping that would 
play havoc with the policy objectives of underlying specific treaty provisions, on the other 
hand.”29  
3. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF ARIBTRATORS‟ ROLE 
Previous examples and analysis give solid basis for deciding on jurisdictional aspects 
of investment disputes. But it is not just deliberations on legal aspects of this matter that 
should be taken into account. International investment law is still is still developing; it 
should develop in compliance with the current tendencies in the contemporary world and 
reflect all the relevant problems and issues from the international arena. The attitude 
towards establishing ICSID jurisdiction by pursuing the application of the MFN clause to 
BIT procedural provisions might depend on the way these tendencies are implemented in 
shaping the system of investment disputes resolution. These considerations form an 
ideological framework, within which legal analysis should take place. How far-reaching 
future decisions of ICSID tribunals might be ultimately depends on how the role of the 
investment disputes settlement system and the role of arbitrators is positioned.  
The decision reached in Maffezini has set in the center of attention the need to 
reconsider ways to find a balance between the legitimate expectations of both disputing 
parties and the observance of the legal regime agreed between them. In that course, it is 
worth taking into consideration that capital-exporting countries have become capital-
importing countries, which implies that they no longer have the interest in only securing 
investors‟ rights. As a consequence,  there is a shift towards private-public debate in which 
there is a clash of state sovereignty and corporate sovereignty (Shan, 2006: 31). In order to 
regulate the investment, this poses the question how to balance between the rights of the 
investors and the right of the host state. This tendency is also visible in investment disputes 
and the issues related to the protection of investors are well-illustrated by the conception 
which is designated as: “private rights, public problems” (Puig, 2013: 36). The nature of 
investment disputes has changed and investors are now able to challenge host countries‟ 
regulatory activities. These disputes concern complex domestic legal issues reaching beyond 
international investment law (Karl, 2013: 1). It is not only that the concerns of investment 
disputes have shifted from traditional questions of expropriation and nationalization to more 
demanding contents; moreover, arbitrations implicate the scope of regulatory powers of the 
respondent states. In addition, a broad variety of public goods disputes has come to be 
addressed trough investment arbitration (Burke-White, Von Staden, 2010: 2). When 
arbitrating, tribunals must be aware that these kinds of disputes always involve significant 
social interests. This means that the outcomes of investment disputes affect more than just 
relations in business sphere. In such conditions, the inter partes nature of investment 
agreements and disputes arising from them comes into question.  
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Bearing in mind the changed nature of investment disputes, the significant effects they 
might have on the community which they originated from as well as the impact on further 
development of investment law, it is legitimate to wonder to what extent the arbitrators 
are Agents of contracting parties, and to what extent they are Agents of global community 
(Stone Sweet, 2010: 4). The answer to this question would reflect the level of credibility 
arbitration enjoys in the public eye, and how much power the parties to BITs are willing to 
vest in the arbitrators. In terms of the arbitrators‟ role and tasks, there are two features which 
are important for answering this question: the ground for legitimacy of the arbitrators‟ power 
and the classification of legal issues, i.e. which area of law the disputed issues fall into. It is 
safe to say that the legitimacy of arbitral power is not initially problematic as it is based on 
an act of delegation of powers to which the parties have freely consented (Stone Sweet, 
2010: 11). But once the arbitrators start to arbitrate, there is a shift in their position in 
relation to the disputing parties. At this point, the simple notion that arbitrators are agents of 
the parties must be reconsidered. This can be explained as a functional change in the arbitral 
power legitimacy, which is derived from the tasks they must fulfill. Tribunals cannot be 
viewed solely as agents of the contracting parties because they are tasked to impartially 
resolving disputes between investors and states and enhance the credibility of the contracting 
parties‟ commitments, which requires a meaningful degree of independence (Roberts, 2013: 
18-19). Furthermore, their power is derived from the notion that any transnational contract 
that contains an arbitration clause and any transnational commercial arbitration are embedded 
in a larger system of law (Stone Sweet, 2010: 12). The issues raised before international 
arbitration tribunals can be best understood as public law issues. The arbitrations which may be 
classified as falling within the scope of public law are those in which the arbitral tribunal has to 
consider the State‟s power and to establish the legal authority of the State to regulate the issue 
in the public interest. The ICSID arbitrators should come to understand their role as public law 
actors and recognize that their awards have impacts well beyond the direct case at hand 
(Burke-White, Von Staden, 2010: 3, 6, 64). 
Previous considerations show that issues that arbitrators deal with involve public law 
obligations and raise significant issues of public concern (Roberts, 2013: 18-19). They 
also demonstrate greater latitude given to the arbitrators‟ role, which is prominent in the 
arbitrators‟ powers and the independence necessary to perform these tasks. With that in 
mind, this analysis of the previous cases adjudicated by the ICSID, placed in the context 
of the altered nature of investment disputes, shows that arbitrators need to observe and 
combine the following tasks:  
1. to respect the mandate and limits of the authority given to them by the arbitration 
agreement, for two very important reasons: 
1.1. it is in line with the autonomy of will of the disputing parties, which is 
essential for arbitration proceedings, and 
1.2. pursuant to article 52 of the ICISD Convention, an arbitral award may be 
annulled if the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
2. to accept and embed in arbitral decisions a broader concept of public interest, and 
relevant social circumstances in which the investment dispute has occurred, not 
limiting themselves solely to the effects that the disputes may have to the parties in 
question, but to the community.  
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This is in line with considerations that could be found in literature that, given the fact 
that global economy is in deep crisis, many of the states are going to be compelled to 
introduce a wide range of measures to preserve national economies, frequently unpopular 
with foreign investors (Stone Sweet, 2010: 24). This might expose them to claims before 
international arbitrations, in which the arbitrators will have to deal with state‟s regulatory 
authority but also with assessing public interests that were meant to be preserved with 
measures in question. Subjecting themselves to such proceeding cannot be appealing to 
the states, especially if they consider the possible outcomes. So if the ICSID does not 
develop a coherent framework for dealing with these cases, the system could well collapse 
(Stone Sweet, 2010: 24). Accepting the change in understanding the role of arbitrators might 
be a step forward in this direction because it would add to greater sensitivity to all the issues 
that need to be addressed when resolving investment disputes. This is in accordance with the 
reasoning that failure to pay under the award will not only be a violation of a State‟s 
obligation to the investor but also a breach of the State‟s international obligations towards 
other contracting states to the convention (Lin, 2012: 4). Since there are greater interests at 
stake, responsibility of the relevant actors needs to be brought to a higher level. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Arbitral proceedings rely on the autonomy of will of the disputing parties. It is up to 
them to decide upon the path for the resolution of their dispute and the authority before 
which the dispute will be resolved. Even so, Article 41 of the ICSID Convention stipulates 
that the tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. Clearly the Convention does not 
empower the tribunals solely to be executors of the parties‟ will but also gives them more 
independence and authority to reach decisions in respect of their own competences on the 
basis of their own knowledge and conviction, which may not always be in accordance 
with the interests of the disputing parties. Being able to establish jurisdiction even if it 
was not specifically contracted can be viewed as one aspect of this authority. Establishing 
ICSID jurisdiction by pursuing the application of the MFN clause can be interpreted as a 
form of converting arbitration into a judicial institution. Solid arguments could be made 
that such application of clauses contained in investment treaties goes beyond the purpose 
and spirit of the ICSID Convention; thus, this manner of interpretation cannot be allowed 
as it is not in line with the basic rules set out in this Convention. However, when trying to 
set the rules for future behaviour of actors relevant for shaping international investment 
law, it must not be forgotten that investment law is constantly developing. This development 
must not be detached from the reality but reflect the latest developments in the immediate 
environment. As demonstrated, relations between states and investors have changed. This 
change is embedded in investment disputes and it is time to face the fact that the change 
must encompass the powers of arbitrators in charge of resolving such disputes. They are 
currently dealing with public law concerns; as their decisions may have a greater impact on 
the international community, it can be argued that they are acting as agents of that particular 
larger community. The arbitrators do not only focus their attention on the disputing parties, 
nor do they intend to narrow and privatize the subject matter of dispute. If we understand 
that the role of arbitrators has changed in this direction, then we are on a good path to allow 
extensive interpretations when the arbitral tribunals decide on their own competence. The 
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analysis of relevant case law shows that establishing the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals by 
relying on the application of the MFN clause can lead to difficulties in practice. However, 
these difficulties are not sufficient reason to dismiss the possibility of allowing for the 
application of the MFN clause in respect of procedural rights.  
As this article shows, changes in the international environment provide sufficient arguments 
to modify the role of arbitrators that would allow them more freedom, independence and more 
maneuver space, until they reach the point where they may be deemed to have exceeded their 
powers. Furthermore, relevant cases show that there are certain rules that can be used when 
determining whether ICSID jurisdiction can be established. It is true that these rules are not set 
in stone, and perhaps it would be more precise to describe them as guidelines rather than 
rules. It should also be noted that tribunals have reached different decisions in different cases 
when it comes to establishing ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of the MFN clause. Yet, it is 
not a novelty in law that, whenever there is a need to subsume a particular case under the 
legal standard, it is the question of interpretation how this will be done. It is therefore 
important to create an ideological framework that would steer these interpretations.  
Using the MFN clause for establishing ICSID jurisdiction raises the degree of the 
arbitrators‟ discretionary authority, which is in line with the conception that their role has 
grown out of inter partes nature of investment disputes. This concept reflects the changed 
nature of investment disputes but its sustainability depends on the political will of actors 
involved. Ideally, it could be viewed as a progressive development in international investment 
arbitrations, as long as the law, legal stability and balance of competing interests are 
preserved, and as long as the arbitrators make the effort to suppress the possibility of abuse 
of rights. This notion is well-illustrated in the decision reached in Maffezini, and it should be 
embedded in future decisions dealing with these issues: “It is clear, in any event, that a 
distinction has to be made between the legitimate extension of rights and benefits by means 
of the operation of the clause, on the one hand, and disruptive treaty-shopping that would 
play havoc with the policy objectives of underlying specific treaty provisions, on the other 
hand.”30  
REFERENCES 
1. Burke-White, W. W., & Von Staden, A., “Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of 
Review in Investor-State Arbitrations”. Yale Journal of International Law, 35, 283, 2010. 
2. Cole, T., “When Is a Forum 'More Favourable'? The Use of MFN Clauses to Found an Investment 
Arbitration Tribunal‟s Jurisdiction”. 2010. 
3. Karl, J., “Investor-state dispute settlement: A government‟s dilemma. Columbia FDI Perspectives”. 
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
International Investment, No. 89, February 18, 2013. 
4. Lin, T. Y., “Systemic Reflections on Argentina's Non-Compliance with ICSID Arbitral Awards: A New 
Role of the Annulment Committee at Enforcement”. Contemp. Asia Arb. J., 5, 1., 2012. 
5. Puig, S., “Emergence & Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & 
International Investment Law”. 2013. 
6. Radi, Y., “The application of the most-favoured-nation clause to the dispute settlement provisions of 
bilateral investment treaties: domesticating the „Trojan Horse‟”. European Journal of International Law, 
18(4), 757-774, (2007). 
7. Roberts, A., “Clash of paradigms: actors and analogies shaping the investment treaty system”. American 
Journal of International Law, 107(1), 45-94, 2013. 
                                                          
30 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, supra note 4, paragraph 63 
 The Application of the Most Favored Nation Clause to the Procedural Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties 127 
8. Shan, W., “From North-South Divide to Private-Public Debate: Revival of the Calvo Doctrine and the 
Changing Landscape in International Investment Law”. Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus., 27, 631, 2006. 
9. Stone Sweet, A., “Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier”. Law and Ethics of Human 
Rights, 4(1), 47-76, 2010. 
10. Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states (1966), 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp 
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980), available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf 
12. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25, 
2000, 16 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 212 (2001); 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002); 124 I.L.R. 9 (2003) 
13. Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction of February 8, 2005, 20 
ICSID Rev.—FILJ 262 (2005); 44 ILM 721 (2005) 
14. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Decision of the Tribunal 
on Jurisdiction of November 29, 2004, 20 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 148 (2005); 44 ILM 569 (2005). 
PRIMENA MFN KLAUZULE NA PROCEDURALNE ODREDBE 
BIT-A – MOGUĆNOSTI ZA ZASNIVANJE NADLEŽNOSTI ICSID 
CENTRA ZA REŠEVANJE INVESTICIONIH SPOROVA 
Ovaj članak istražuje probleme vezane za zasnivanje nadležnosti ICSID centra primenom MFN 
klauzule na odredbe BIT-a kojima je ureĎeno rešavanje investicionih sporova. Imajući u vidu da takva 
primena ove klauzule zahteva ekstenzivnu interpretaciju BIT-a u kome je sadržana, praksa ICSID 
tribunala u ovoj oblasti je izazvala brojne polemike u stručnoj i akademskoj javnosti. U pitanje je 
dovedena stabilnost, predvidivost i pravna sigurnost u oblasti meĎunarodnog investicionog prava i, 
još značajnije, dalji razvoj ove oblasti prava – posmatrano u kontekstu ovlašćenja arbitara. Članak 
analizira tri reprezentativna slučaja u kojima su ICSID tribunali doneli odluke o svojoj nadležnosti 
primenjujući MFN klauzulu: Maffezini, Plama i Salini. Na osnovu ove analize ovih slučajeva, predlažu se 
smernice koje bi mogle da se primenjuju u budućim sporovima koji se budu našli pred tribunalima ICSID 
centra. Ove smernice su vezane za savremene tendencije na meĎunarodnoj sceni, koje bi trebalo da se 
uzmu u obzir kao pokazatelji daljeg pravca u razvoju meĎunarodnog investiciong prava. 
Ključne reči: MFN klauzula, investicioni sporovi, nadležnost ICSID centra. 
